WASHINGTON D.C. (March 11, 2026) – In a new op-ed published by The Hill, McCain Institute Executive Director Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas shares insight from the Munich Security Conference about U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia. Dr. Farkas describes Japan’s approach to maintaining alliance with the United States, without compromising with its adversaries, and describes a model for other U.S. allies to follow.
The Hill
By Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas
March 11, 2026
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5777630-japan-defense-china-threat/
Recently I witnessed Secretary of State Marco Rubio get a standing ovation at the Munich Security Conference — but within just a few hours, European teeth were gnashing.
While the tone of his speech was considered constructive, and a huge improvement over the vice president’s address at the forum last year, Europeans didn’t rejoice over the content. The concern was summed up by the Estonian minister of defense, when he commented in a television interview that the relationship with the United States used to be unconditional, but now it’s conditional. Europeans are adjusting to the fact that the U.S. government will engage based on hard interests; the Trump administration wants to see action.
Europe should be careful not to overreact. The Trump administration’s approach to allies — as reflected in its strategy documents and the statements of the president — has been unconventional. New polling reveals that the reputation of the United States as a reliable ally is crumbling, pushing historic allies to strengthen their relationships with other military powers.
This shift in the world order has galvanized allies in Europe and Asia to increase their defense spending and significantly increase their share of our collective military commitment to deterrence and war-fighting, if attacked. The downside has been a significant erosion of trust and goodwill, forcing allies to hedge and explore closer, more pragmatic relationships with China.
This is a mistake. We do not share values and interests with China, and Beijing will gladly take advantage of any of our allies, given the opportunity. The Japanese understand this, and provide a model for a sober-minded interest and values-based reaction to U.S. policy under the second Trump administration.
The week before the Munich Security Conference the Japanese people resoundingly elected Sanae Takaichi, the first woman to lead the country, to continue to serve as their prime minister. Takaichi is a tough center-right leader who campaigned on national security at a time when the Japanese are anxious about demographic, economic and geopolitical change, and questioning the U.S. commitment and ability to protect Japan from China and Russia. She had been in office for only four months, placed there as the head of the Liberal Democratic Party, when she called for snap elections in a gamble to gain a clear mandate for her policy platform. She has it now.
The Japanese have also begun questioning America’s commitment out loud. Earlier this year, at the McCain Institute’s Sedona Forum-Tokyo, retired Japanese Adm. Yoshihide Yoshida pointed out that it is no longer a given that the United States sits at the center of the Asia-Pacific security order. For more than seven decades the United States was the hub, with bilateral alliances serving as spokes. Now, Yoshida states America is “becoming variable.” Indeed, other Japanese have said in private, “unreliable.” Japan must now prepare for “strategic autonomy,” a fancy term for defending the island nation from its main threat, China — without the U.S.
Leaders in South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines are reaching the same conclusion. Is it possible for Asian democracies to balance China conventionally — not to mention in the nuclear context? Can these countries deter China from attacking them, seizing Taiwan or restricting access to the South China Sea, without the backing of the United States? The likely answer today is no — they will still need the United States engaged in the region, even if Washington is only the security guarantor of last resort.
The middle and small powers in Asia-Pacific are being forced to build up their militaries, and this new unstable arrangement will increase uncertainty and the risk of war. One way to mitigate against rivalries among those countering China would be to further strengthen current small multilateral groupings of countries, such as the Quad, AUKUS, Japan–Australia–Philippines cooperation, and combinations of trilaterals that include the United States. Still, none of them, separately or together, can yet provide the military scale and crisis management the U.S. has provided with its size, superior intelligence and deployment capabilities.
The Japanese, like the Europeans and Canadians, have responded by initiating a defense buildup and working more closely with one another and with other democracies in Asia and Europe. But while NATO allies seem to be hedging, re-engaging somewhat with China, the Japanese government is highly unlikely to take such a step.
Japan is reassured by the U.S. National Defense Strategy, which emphatically includes holding the U.S.-allied maritime defense line against China at the “first island chain,” which would include Taiwan and all of Japan. The new Takaichi government is expected to meet U.S. expectations by raising defense spending by 9.4 percent to a record $58 billion, relaxing prohibitions on nuclear submarines and arms exports, building an intelligence infrastructure long resisted by Japanese officials and society and, finally, revising the constitution to state the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces.
Europe would serve itself well to focus on action — to demonstrate strength against Russia and China, as the Japanese are doing, without confusing trade or other accommodations or capitulations towards either adversary. NATO allies must stand up to Russia with strong deterrence, credibly threatening Vladimir Putin with countermeasures to his ongoing attacks on NATO territory, and they must work harder to squeeze China’s economic and technical support to Russia in its neoimperial war against Ukraine.
NATO must build upon the engagement with Asian allies initiated during the Obama administration. At the Tokyo Sedona Forum, Japanese Minister Kono Taro declared, “I hope NATO after Ukraine becomes a global institution to defend our interests.” That may be a bit ambitious, but it reflects Japan’s approach — maintaining full-throated support for its alliance with the United States, without hedging or compromising with its adversaries. There is a lesson here for Brussels, U.S. allies and partners in European capitals.
Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is the executive director at the McCain Institute.