Analysis: Pre-Election Mission to Moldova

Analysis
Pre-Election Mission to Moldova
September 1-5, 2025
By Laura Thornton

Introduction

Moldovans head to the polls on September 28 to elect all 101 members of parliament, an election that will determine the country’s trajectory. Moldova will either continue towards a democratic future within Europe or backslide into Russia’s orbit. Unlike national elections elsewhere, where the choice is between various ideological or policy directions, in this election the competition is not right or left but an existential fight against Russia. The elections will also have consequences far beyond Moldova. Moldova is serving as a laboratory for the Kremlin to test cutting-edge weapons, which will soon be deployed elsewhere. Should Russia’s hybrid warfare in the country succeed in thwarting a European win, Moldova will become a pliant state from which Russia can expand its operations into neighboring Ukraine and Romania, a European Union (EU) member.

To better understand this environment, together with the German Marshall Fund and European Council on Foreign Relations, the McCain Institute organized a pre-election mission to Moldova September 1-4, 2025. The trip was also supported by the Moldovan think tank Platform for Security and Defense Initiative. The delegation (see appendix) included experts on malign foreign influence, elections, and democracy as well as journalists from Europe and the United States. The purpose of the mission was to understand the pre-election environment in Moldova to inform policy makers and publics back home.

The delegation met with government leaders, including President Maia Sandu and Prime Minister Dorin Recean, independent journalists, representatives from the major political blocs competing in the elections, civil society, business leaders, diplomats, security experts, the Central Election Commission (CEC), and election observers.

The McCain Institute staff also traveled to the autonomous region of Gagauzia and the town of Triaclia on September 5 to meet with media groups.

A key takeaway from the mission is that “influence operations” is an utterly inaccurate term to describe what is happening in Moldova. Russia is engaged in a multi-vector war not only to thwart Moldova from its democratic trajectory toward European Union (EU) membership (approved by a narrow majority in a referendum last Fall) and bring to heel in Russia’s sphere of influence but also to threaten broader security in Eastern Europe and geopolitical alignment. By investing hundreds of millions of dollars through cryptocurrency and illegal financial schemes, the Kremlin has coopted major political contenders and infiltrated the Church, information space, and voters. The Moldovan government and civic actors have struggled to fight back in this asymmetrical fight.

An almost unanimous concern shared with the mission is the possibility that the elections will be contested should the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secure a majority. Russia and its proxies are sowing the ground to reject the results of the elections, casting doubts on the integrity of the election process, the role of diaspora voting, and the security of the count. The delegation learned that Russia is planning sabotage activities, including street fights, protests, and other kinetic acts to disrupt voting and cause post-election chaos.

Another finding is that while European representatives acknowledge the stakes of this election and have clearly taken the side against Russia by supporting only pro-EU parties with no links to Moscow, U.S. officials assert the U.S. has “no dog in this fight.” In fact, through the elimination of foreign aid, the U.S. is undermining Moldova’s efforts to defend against Russia. In every single meeting, Moldovans described how the cuts in U.S. support have been, in the words of one journalist, “a gift to Russia,” with estimates of USAID cuts at over 150 million dollars. Essential work debunking Russian narratives, providing accurate information on elections, the EU, Ukraine, and the economy, monitoring illicit financing, and bolstering civic resilience has stopped. One media group said that while it still received funding from the State Department, it was told the funding couldn’t be used for work countering Russian disinformation.

U.S. policymakers need to understand the consequences of these elections and should be drastically increasing our cooperation with the Moldovan intelligence community, bolstering funding and technical assistance for civil society and media, and enhancing sanctions against cryptocurrencies and illegal financing schemes and individuals. Our engagement on the frontlines is needed not just to stop another domino from falling into the Kremlin’s sphere, but to protect ourselves. Supporting democratic Moldova directly serves U.S. interests.

Political Context

In August 1991, Moldova declared independence from the Soviet Union. Independent Moldova immediately faced separatist movements and unrest by the Gagauz, a Turkic minority, and in the Transnistria region, aided by Russian military forces. Gagauzia was granted local autonomy in 1994 and is currently ruled by its own governor, executive committee, and legislature. The Moldovan constitution authorized a similar special status for Transnistria, which was rejected by the authorities there, and Transnistrian residents voted for independence in 2006. The international community has not recognized this independent status. Under the Transnistria constitution, the president serves as prime minister and there is a unicameral legislature. Russia still maintains 1500 troops in the region.

Since its break from the Soviet Union, Moldova has sought closer ties with Europe, starting with a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994. In 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU, paving the way for reforms to align Moldova’s economy and policy to EU standards. The full scale invasion of Ukraine provided further momentum for the country to align westward, and the government led by President Maia Sandu of the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) officially applied for EU membership in 2022, and candidate status was granted soon after.

In November 2024, simultaneous with the election for president in which Sandu won reelection, voters backed a constitutional referendum to join the EU, by the slimmest of margins at 50.39 percent. In the presidential race, Maia Sandu won 55 percent of the second-round vote over Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the Kremlin-aligned socialist party, who won 45 percent. Sandu ran on a campaign backing EU integration, while Stoianoglo opposed the EU referendum and campaigned on improving relations with Russia.

In addition to Russia’s hybrid warfare in the country (described below), Russia has also exacerbated an energy crisis in the country. Russia halted gas imports in December 2024, triggering widespread fear of no heat for the harsh winter months, especially in the breakaway, pro-Russian Transnistria region. By weaponizing energy as a way to force continued Moldovan dependence, Russia sowed discontent towards Moldovan’s pro-EU leadership. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inflation was at 30 percent.

Though GDP has increased under the ruling party leadership, it is still among the lowest in Europe, and recent polling lists the economy as a major concern for voters. According to a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in May 2025, 63 percent of respondents cite the economy as the most important problem facing the country, including cost of living, low income, and other financial issues.

Russia’s warfare

Almost everyone with whom the delegation met declared Russia’s hybrid warfare in Moldova unprecedented and existential. Government officials described to the delegation how the FSB (Russian intelligence) has prioritized Moldova and is adapting their tactics, learning from interventions in Abkhazia (a break-away region of Georgia) and Armenia, and using both internal and external services.

Both Moldovan stakeholders as well as diplomats agreed that Russia’s immediate goal is to prevent a PAS majority, thereby slowing or stopping the European accession process and creating instability through a weak coalition, and thus snap elections. Ultimately, this period of confusion and non-alignment will pave the way for more robust Russian control in the future.

To achieve this goal, Russia employs multiple weapons. Information manipulation is a key one, and, according to Moldovans, has reached an unprecedented level. Russia carries out its information operations through diverse avenues. On Telegram, Russia has penetrated an exponentially growing number of anonymous and local channels. Russia has also set up fake mailbox accounts to overwhelm voters with false texts and emails claiming to be from a ministry or foreign delegation. In one case, a fake message came out under the name of the Minister of Education claiming that schools would have mandatory LGBTQ awareness classes. Civic groups report the prevalence of Russian “AI slop” dominating algorithms, as well as use of AI to automatically comment on social media posts. One group said 80 percent of the comments on government pages are AI-generated.

Russian TV stations have dodged legal blocks by infiltrating new domains on browsers and apps. According to several independent media representatives, over 178 TV channels from Russia are flooding the market. According to one official, three Russian TV channels are the top five most popular in the country. Even seemingly innocuous Russian drama and movies infiltrate Russian messages. The Moldovan government struggles to keep up with this, in the words of one government leader, “cat and mouse” situation as Russia easily adapts and changes course, utilizing AI and new technological tricks to avoid detection and stay online.

Messages are carefully crafted for different target audiences, and, as one civic group said, Russia’s disinformation is “a la carte.”

One group of narratives is designed to turn Moldovans away from the EU, spreading lies about EU integration and claiming Moldova will lose its sovereignty, identity, and culture. The delegation was told that messages like “the EU will turn you gay” or “the EU will turn your children against you” are prevalent. Further, narratives that the EU will make Moldova a colony and the country will lose its sovereignty are common. Other messages emphasize the cumbersome EU regulations and rules. Interestingly, several groups said that Russia was using U.S. critiques of the EU in their messages.

Another theme of Russia’s information war focuses on the West dragging the country into war and instability, a narrative that had great success in Georgia ahead of their parliamentary elections last year. Further, these campaigns emphasize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine, blaming the government for high energy prices.

Russia’s information campaigns also tap into the low trust in government, misrepresenting or spreading disinformation about the government’s policies, arguing that the government has failed to deliver. Many messages directly target President Sandu, saying she has “no soul,” calling her a “yellow witch,” and criticizing her lack of children. One journalist from Triaclia said that a narrative widely believed in her community was that Sandu bought “biological material (sperm) from Elton John.”

The delegation was told how Russia also targets the diaspora. The key narrative for this group is that PAS will never get into the EU and only puts Moldova at risk for conflict.

Finally, Russia and its proxies (paid operatives, parties, and oligarchs) are also sowing the ground to reject the results of the elections. CEC officials said the widespread information onslaught casting doubt on the integrity of the election process, the role of diaspora voting, and the security of the count was one of their biggest challenges. Candidates are preparing for a result they “don’t like.” The CEC described one video purporting to show an “illegal ballot,” but the video was fake (and in fact the ballot shown was from Romania).

The Moldovan Orthodox Church is another important weapon in Russia’s war. This is most problematic because of the continuously high public trust in the Church. Moldovan officials described how Moldovan priests serve as Kremlin operatives. Priests are motivated more by financial payments rather than ideology, and one security expert said that more than one-third of all priests are on Russia’s payroll. A senior government official reported that Moscow flies priests to trainings abroad, such as in Serbia and Turkey, to help them set up their own Telegram channels and TikTok presence. According to Moldova’s Service of Information and Security public report, in August and September 2024, approximately 500 priests and parishioners of the Orthodox Church of Moldova traveled to Moscow on so-called “pilgrimages.” Upon arriving in Moscow, clergy sign a contract with “EVRAZIA” to receive a bank card with the Russian payment system “Mir” to receive payment from the Russian Orthodox Church, amounting to 1,000 USD. In return, the priests disseminate anti-EU messages, including the advantages of “non-alignment” for the sake of peace. For the 2024 elections, priests also collected signatures in favor of electoral candidates.

Civic groups also shared that teachers have been recruited by Russia as influencers. A program called “Eurasia Gymnasium” attempts to rewrite the Russia-Moldova relationship in classrooms.

According to officials and monitors, Russia is also planning kinetic activities to enhance its sabotage efforts, including arson attacks, protests, false flag operations, and street fights. According to government officials and security experts, on election day, Russia will try to mobilize from Transnistria to carry out such efforts, including possible false flag operations on the security line. Officials warn that Russia will make bomb and cyber threats, cut electricity, and provoke fights at polling stations through paid instigators, all to create chaos and doubt. After the elections, if the pro-Russian party blocs are unsuccessful, they will declare the elections were “rigged” and instigate attempts to overthrow the results. According to election observers, there is potential for violence. Or in the words of one, “There definitely will be violence.”

To pay for these activities, Russia’s financial investments in Moldova, which, always significant, have grown exponentially, according to Moldovan officials who track Russian operations. Russia has enlisted the help of local oligarchs, namely Ilan Shor (currently in exile in Moscow) who has owned media outlets, sports teams, businesses, and criminal enterprises, as well as political parties to serve Russian interests in Moldova. The Kremlin has established complex pyramid schemes using cryptocurrency and banking apps to directly transfer money to political parties, candidates, influencers, and voters. Shor has set up shell companies in the Emirates and other countries from where to conduct operations. While several parties have been banned due to their direct links with Russian financing, several have regrouped into new party formations and blocs, often by registering as independent candidates. (An amendment to bar individuals from banned political parties to run independently was struck down by the Constitutional Court.)

For the 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum vote, crypto coins via Kyrgyzstan, such as A7A5, were used for wire transfers to multiple bank accounts, resulting in thousands of transactions each day. Crypto is also converted to cash on the black market utilizing organized crime, eager to turn their cash into crypto. While the authorities were able to sanction A7A5, Russia simply moves to new coins. Moldovan authorities have identified 100s of millions of dollars in illegal financing, though they claim this is a fraction of the real investment.

Diplomats report that Moldovan authorities are better prepared this year than last but are greatly overwhelmed. With the help of foreign partners, Moldova has fortified its electoral infrastructure and cyber security, continues to shut down illegal sites and financial transfers, and proactively communicates with voters. However, Russia is nimble and constantly employing new methods. Further, they warn of more “kinetic interference” compared to last year’s elections. Other stakeholders agree that the country has improved its media response, banking response, and criminal investigations.

However, Moldovan authorities emphasize that the fight is grossly asymmetrical. As Liliana Vitu, head of the Audiovisual Council of the Republic of Moldova said, “Our efforts to build resilience, offer truthful information, and combat Russian hybrid warfare are important but the fight against Russia is completely asymmetrical. We are bringing a butter knife to a gun fight. But it is our duty to keep building democracy while defending it.”

Political Playing Field

There are 64 political parties registered in Moldova, although most parties are dormant and unlikely to participate in elections. Many parties have unclear (or non-existent) platforms and suspected ties to oligarchs.

The political landscape is primarily shaped by four blocs/parties that could clear the threshold: the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); the Patriotic Bloc or Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS); the National Alternative Movement (MAN); and Our Party of Renato Usatii. PAS, currently the ruling party of President Maia Sandu, is known for its pro-EU stance and stands at about 30 percent. As one election observer stated, “there is no real pro-EU option outside PAS that will get into parliament.”

The Patriotic Bloc, an alliance between the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) was formed following visits to Moscow by the leaders of these parties. It promises good relations with Russia to secure export markets and cheap gas. It garners around 10 percent in polls.

The other two contenders, according to independent monitors, have links to Russia and emphasize ambiguous themes of “Moldovan sovereignty” and “strategic foreign engagement,” viewed as code for colder ties with Brussels. Alternativa Bloc is composed of the National Alternative Movement, the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova, and the Common Action Party (Civil Congress) as well as Alexandr Stoianoglo (former presidential candidate who competed against President Maia Sandu and was backed by the Communists and Socialists Bloc in 2024). Alternativa has about seven percent support. Our Party of Mayor Usatii is the “wild card” at around five percent. According to pollsters, many Moldovans are undecided.

According to observers, parties have focused little on policy or ideology. As one diplomat summed up, PAS’s platform is about saving the country while the other blocs are running on a message that everything wrong is the fault of the government and the EU. One international observer summed it up as follows: PAS’s campaign is a “catch-all” on peace, development, and the EU; the Patriotic Bloc is running on Moldovan sovereignty and relations with Russia; Alternativa is a diverse bloc that claims to be pro-EU but has many ties to Russia; and Renato Usatii is purely an individualistic operation running on his personality and memes.

PAS officials argue that they have a clear platform and are running on an economic message. They are highlighting that Moldova is no longer dependent on Russia for energy, the EU market is open for trade, and infrastructure has improved (e.g. roads and hospitals). They also are using Baltic states in their campaign as an example of the benefits of EU membership.

Usatii boasted that his party includes “Russian interests, central interests, left, and right.” He told the delegation that his party is non-aligned and describes the party’s platform as “just me, I am the program.” He is running on his reputation as a mayor and promises good management and trade deals. After the election, in which he aims to win 15 seats, he says he will not support EU reforms but likes the idea of joining the Schengen visa-free zone. Usatii has campaigned to reach pro-Russian voters in Moldova, including bringing in sanctioned Russian artists to perform.  He is dismissive of security threats facing the country and boasts of plans to liquidate intelligence, anticorruption, and police agencies.

Alternativa representatives’ primary complaint to the delegation was about PAS’s malfeasance and damage, not Russia’s. In fact, they argue that PAS is “exaggerating” the threat from Russia and Shor. They accuse PAS of abusing state resources and lacking transparency. They described their mandate as being more professional and efficient than PAS, and their platform includes both deregulation plans as well as expanding social services. Representatives assert that they are pro-EU but will pursue membership in a “more efficient way” than PAS. Though one of their key leaders, Stoianoglo, was against the EU referendum. Another Alternativa leader, Mayor of Chisinau Ion Ceban, who has ties in Moscow (visiting there in 2022) is banned from entering Romania or the Schengen zone for “national security reasons,” and the U.S. declared his MAN party as a conduit for Russian influence.

If no party reaches a majority – a strong possibility – forming a coalition will be problematic. PAS has stated it will not form a coalition with the other contenders due to their links to Russia. Both Alternativa and Our Party both said they would not join a coalition with PAS (though Alternativa representatives suggested it could be a possibility depending on concessions). It is possible the opposition parties could form a “grand coalition,” ushering in a period of conflict between the President and parliament, putting a brake on the EU accession process, reversing regulations to limit Russian influence, and possibly introducing regulation of civil society and media (Georgia scenario).

Electoral Framework

Law and procedures

Moldova’s electoral code of 2022 governs the procedures for organizing and conducting elections. The CEC is responsible for conducting elections. It is led by nine members, eight nominated by parliamentary parties and one by the president. Since the banning of the Shor Party, the CEC currently has five members appointed by the ruling PAS and three by Patriotic Bloc.

At the district level are 37 District Electoral Councils (DEC), including a DEC for Gagauzia and Transnistria. Each political party represented in parliament appoints members to the DECs, while the DEC chair is a permanent bureaucratic appointment. Below the DECs are 2,219 Precinct Election Bureaus (PEBs) that conduct voting and the count on election day.  PEBs are run by three members appointed by the local council and one representative from each parliamentary political party.

In 2024, parliament passed two amendments – the elimination of a ban on referenda within 60 days of an election (paving the way for the EU vote in 2024) and the establishment of postal voting for Moldovans abroad. The first amendment drew criticism for failing to include public comment and allowing for an election for political office and a referendum to be held the same day, though the Constitutional Court upheld its legality when challenged. The absentee voting amendment also drew criticism for its lack of public consultation and transparency in drafting, as well as its rushed adoption ahead of the 2024 elections. An additional amendment barring individuals from banned political parties to run independently was struck down by the Constitutional Court.

Late-stage legislative amendments in 2025, on electoral corruption, extremist activity, and media regulation, aligned partially with the EU recommendations, have left minimal time for implementation.

Diaspora participation was bolstered in the 2024 elections by the record number of polling stations established abroad and the pilot introduction of postal voting in six countries (which is not allowed inside Moldova). The turnout of eligible overseas voters reached 72 percent in the first round and 80 percent in the second round of the presidential election. The CEC proposed, and the parliament approved, increasing to ten the number of countries where postal voting will be used in these upcoming parliamentary elections.

Moldova has strict campaign finance regulations designed to create a level playing field and restrict illicit funding in elections. The 2022 electoral code mandated detailed reporting requirements for electoral subjects — including weekly reports and a final report three days after the elections – limits on cash donations, campaign spending ceilings, and stringent penalties for any violations.  

Challenges

Representatives of the CEC shared numerous challenges with the delegation. The commission has just completed the registration of candidates. There were 50 applications including 25 parties, 21 independents, and four blocs. The commission had to reject many of the applications because the data was not adequate. For example, parties are required to submit “declarations of integrity,” but several failed to do so, and several did not honor the 40 percent gender quota. Many of the independent registrants failed to meet the threshold of 51 candidates. These decisions go to the court, which can move slowly, and the commission is unable to print ballots until verdicts are made.

As with campaign finance rules elsewhere, enforcement presents a challenge due to lack of capacity, resources, and expertise. The regulations have also incentivized political actors to find other avenues of influence, including the use of cryptocurrency, or operating outside the 30-day campaign period. Civic groups and election monitors told the delegation that campaign finance laws should be enforced more rigorously, with investigations and prosecutions carried out swiftly to deter illicit funding and vote-buying. Further, they said interagency cooperation needs to be strengthened, particularly in the areas of cybersecurity, online political advertising oversight, and coordinated responses to disinformation.  

The CEC reported that their biggest challenges were to address Russia’s disinformation campaigns that are eroding trust in the elections and prevent vote-buying. Russia and its proxies have shared deep fakes about the elections, including videos showing fake ballots. CEC officials complain that the social media platforms are too slow to respond to requests for takedowns. The CEC cooperates with anti-corruption and law enforcement authorities to try to address vote-buying, but they explained Russia’s tactics moved too quickly. For example, Russia keeps using new applications for bank transfers. Cybersecurity is also a risk as attacks are more sophisticated. Last year, an attack on the CEC lasted 15 hours and led to speculation about their competency.

As in other countries, there has been an explosion of so-called “fake” observer organizations seeking accreditation. These organizations do not meet standards of transparency and methodology outlined in the universal declaration of principles for observation, such as disclosing funding sources. They can help sow doubt on the conduct of the elections. So far, the CEC has not accredited such groups but worry their decisions will be challenged as there is no specific regulation banning them.

The opposition has several complaints about the CEC and election process. The opposition argues that the reform to expand polling stations abroad disproportionately benefits PAS, while the government defends it as a step toward greater inclusiveness and democratic participation. They also criticize the geographic distribution of polling stations. There will be two stations in Russia, while Europe will have a greater number of stations, where the diaspora is generally more pro-EU. Their complaints in many ways reveal an acknowledgement of their orientation vis-a-vis the EU and Russia.

Representatives from Alternativa complained to the delegation that the CEC was biased in its decision-making. For example, Alternativa representatives said that PAS had campaign banners outside the official campaign period, but the CEC ignored their complaint. They also filed complaints to the CEC that local authorities removed Alternativa banners and had refused to approve their events, but the CEC dismissed the complaints. Alternativa also argued that the campaign finance and banking regulations were too strict.

Finally, opposition representatives argue that the recent changes to the electoral law were passed too quickly and without transparency. Independent civic and electoral groups have agreed with this claim.

According to polling, trust in elections is low. Sixty percent of Moldovans do not believe elections are free and fair, but 70 percent trust their local administration. One pollster said that 35 percent of Moldovans believe there will be fraud in the elections.

Media and Civil Society

According to Reporters Without Borders, the media landscape in Moldova is highly polarized between pro-Western and pro-Russian content. Further, the role of oligarchs in editorial decision-making has impacted the information space. Ilan Shor, the pro-Kremlin oligarch, in particular had significant impact through his media empire, but the government suspended the licenses of several channels, including those linked to him.

According to Internews polling, television remains the most trusted source of news and information for most Moldovans (53%), although online media is increasingly used as a source of information. Moldovan media outlets are financially unstable. Independent media representatives described in detail to the delegation how their work has been devastated by the elimination of USAID, and how this has been “a gift to Russia.” The cuts have forced them to stop their counter-messaging, debunking materials, and general reporting. They said they have tried different business models, but advertising and crowdsourcing are difficult.

Authorities banned 12 TV stations and around 30 websites in 2022 and 2023, including some of the most popular in the country, for spreading Russian disinformation. Currently, nine TV stations remain banned. To protect Moldovan information space, parliament has passed the Law on Advertising and the Law on Access to Public Information, which aims to better align Moldovan legislation with international standards. Civic groups and watchdogs have accused the legislation process as lacking transparency, and the opposition has accused the authorities of censorship and restricting freedom of press.

Despite the financial constraints, independent media groups have taken creative measures to provide accurate information to the public. One media outlet in Gagauzia described hosting a YouTube channel, a weekly talk show, a podcast twice a week, and regular daily news updates. Other media groups have actively infiltrated spaces where Russian disinformation dominates – Telegram channels, TikTok, and Instagram. They report on politics, the economy, and foreign affairs and publish so-called “debunking” materials. Journalists in Chisinau reported to the delegation that radio remained one of the only stable markets for accurate news.

A media group called Tuk in Triaclia, an ethnically Bulgarian region, described fighting disinformation through short segments entitled “finding out in 60 seconds.” They have done outreach to raise awareness about fake news and how to identify it but explain how the public reacted by accusing them of being fake. They have also exposed corruption in local government.

Tuk also shows reels about life in Europe in order to counter the anti-EU narratives in their community. In addition, they air segments on life in Russia where there is no freedom or future, spotlighting artists who have fled the country. They are present on YouTube, Tiktok, Instagram, and online radio. For their work, their journalists have been attacked by “Shor’s men” and received death threats.

While the space for civil society to operate is free, civic organizations complain of serious financial vulnerability, particularly with the USAID cuts. Despite challenges, groups have invested in building citizen resilience with programs designed to enhance social cohesion, civic contribution, cognitive resistance, and unity. Civic groups have cooperated with creative social media influencers to go on offense promoting digital and offline campaigns on the benefits of the EU. The aim is to “wake people up, but gently” by sharing positive stories from countries that have joined the EU. They show pictures and videos of churches being repaired by the EU, for example. They have also highlighted the poor quality of life in Russia, including podcasts with Moldovans sent to Siberia.

The U.S. has cut support for almost all domestic media and civic organizations, but also knee-capped international organizations. USAID cancelled $32 million dollars for Internews, which supported multiple independent media and countered disinformation programs, as well as $22 million in funding to support free and fair elections. Organizations like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, which were both cut by USAID, deploy monitors and train local election groups, absolutely critical activities during this highly volatile election period. IREX, which provides support to numerous media, civic education and information integrity initiatives, lost their U.S. funding. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which conduct essential public diplomacy work and provide accurate information in a media environment dominated by Russia in places like Moldova, have also been cut.

Gagauzia

McCain Institute staff visited the autonomous region of Gagauzia. In this staunchly pro-Russian region, 97 percent of the population voted against the EU referendum. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Gagauzians supported Russia and blamed Ukraine for the conflict. In fact, Gagauzians have volunteered to fight with Russia in Ukraine. An independent journalist told us that Gagauzians believe Moscow is the “only civilization” and Russia provides economic benefits (though reality is the opposite). Additionally, school teachers in the region are trained in Russia. All media operating in the region directly transmit Kremlin narratives.

This pro-Russian orientation is perplexing given the horrors Gagauzians experienced under the Soviet Union, including massive famine in the ’40s, widely recognized as genocide, that wiped out 40 percent of the population and the mass deportation of so-called “rich peasants” to Russia. However, Russification intensified under Soviet control, including historical whitewashing. A local independent civic group described an effort in 2019 to remember the famine, and it was met with a huge backlash.

The Russian Federation regularly funds local mercenaries in the region to mobilize voters and ensure Russian loyalty among the population. Election observers report that this activity is increasing during the campaign season.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In the words of one leader, “Moldova is a small country but can become a big problem.” The recurrent message to the delegation was “do not underestimate Russia.”

Russia’s interest in Moldova goes well beyond Moldova. Moldova will serve as a Russian infiltration point to the EU, with EU member Romania on the border, allowing easy access for information and financial flows as well as cyberattacks in Europe. The American military presence in Romania, for example, would be an enticing target. As one official reminded the delegation, “Soviets brought troops to Cuba in civilian clothes.” If control of the border and customs is in pro-Russian hands, the floodgates will be open for attack. A pliant Moldova would also allow Russia to further encircle Ukraine, allowing a strategic vantage point from which to conduct hybrid operations or possible attacks on Odesa, a much-prized Russian target just miles away.

Moldova is Russia’s petri dish for piloting its innovations in warfare before turning them against the rest of the world, and we should be present to advance our preparedness. In the words of one official, “What is happening here will happen to you as well.” Our engagement on the frontlines is needed not just to stop another domino from falling into the Kremlin’s sphere, but to protect ourselves.

For Moldovan citizens, parties, and officials:

• Moldovan voters should refuse any financial payments for their participation in the electoral process and report such efforts to authorities.
• Moldovans must be careful in their information consumption, seeking different perspectives and visiting independent media sites.
• CEC should communicate openly about the electoral process, including voting, tabulation, and complaints resolution, making electoral data publicly available.
• CEC should continue efforts to preempt and debunk disinformation about the election process through regular public outreach and transparency.
• Political parties and contestants must commit to follow the CEC rules and regulations for campaigning, immediately alerting authorities of any vote-buying or violations among their campaign staff.
• Political parties and contestants must forcefully communicate to supporters to reject any acts of violence during or after the election process and to remain calm as the CEC works to certify the official results.
• All electoral complaints should be filed through proper legal channels and judicial decisions should be followed.
• The Moldovan government should provide clear instructions to all civil servants to not misuse administrative resources and put in place monitoring and accountability mechanisms.
• The Moldovan government should continue cross-agency coordination (CEC, central bank, police, tax authorities) and intelligence sharing to defend against hybrid attacks and fortify electoral security.
• Religious leaders should not participate in the campaign, per Moldovan law.

For the international community:

• EU and U.S. officials must address finance operations like terrorist cells. Cryptocurrency investments in Moldova are transnational. Russia is effectively using third countries and international banking to carry out its warfare and this requires international cooperation, and possible sanctions on third countries or banks. More investment is needed in law enforcement, banking controls, and intelligence.
• EU and U.S. should consider personal and financial sanctions for known pro-Russian operatives in Moldova, particularly those responsible for illegal financing schemes or sabotage efforts.
• EU and U.S. should enhance training and technical assistance to, and increase intelligence cooperation with, Moldovan authorities on cybersecurity, electoral violence prevention, border security, and targeting illicit finance.
• EU and U.S. should increase exchanges and study visits with Moldovan trusted local leaders, priests, and influencers.
• The U.S. should reinstate its critical funding for independent media organizations and local civil society groups that provide essential reporting on politics, the economy, and foreign policy, conduct resilience-building initiatives, including civic education and media literacy, monitor and report on Russian hybrid warfare, and carry out a variety of disinformation activities, particularly in the pro-Russian regions.
• The U.S. should reinstate critical public diplomacy programs, including funding for the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Support for international organizations like Internews, IREX, and others working to enhance local journalism and education and support for Moldovan civil society should be increased.
• The U.S. should reinstate funding for international election observation organizations like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute so they can enhance their presence in Moldova through increased pre-election and election day monitoring and bolster their training and technical assistance to Moldovan election observation groups.
• The U.S. should reinstate funding for domestic election monitors that are key to evaluating the conduct of the elections, exposing irregularities, and building public trust in the process.
• The U.S. should reinstate support of Moldovan critical energy infrastructure projects, which are essential in defending the country against Russian manipulation.
• Social media platforms must respond more quickly to remove disinformation about the elections and their outcome and dedicate more resources to identify inauthentic behavior.

Following the elections, the U.S. and EU need to prepare for different scenarios and instability and should be in lockstep on how to evaluate the elections and on future engagement with the next government.

• The international community must stand behind the findings from trusted domestic and international observers about the integrity of the elections.
• The EU and U.S. should invest significantly in post-election observer efforts, including high-level international delegations to monitor developments and demonstrate support.

The international community will need to closely monitor the post-election environment, particularly given the prospect of protests rejecting the results in the case of a pro-EU victory, and facilitate a peaceful sitting of a new parliament.

Further, Moldova’s security is dependent on several external factors including:

• Strong U.S.-EU cooperation, commercial stability, and market predictability.
• A just and lasting peace for Ukraine.

This report is offered in the spirit of democratic partnership with the aim of encouraging free and fair elections in September and a peaceful transition to the next parliament.