Assessment: Pre-Election Mission to Armenia

Assessment
Pre-Election Mission to Armenia
February 23-26, 2026
By Laura Thornton

Introduction

Armenians head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of parliament at a time of critical regional and geopolitical consequences. The 2018 Velvet Revolution and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war have presented new foreign policy alignments and possibilities for the country. Previously dependent on Russia for security guarantees, the country’s relationship with its protector soured since the war, and the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pursued new ties with the European Union (EU) and the United States. Further, regional calculations have dramatically changed, paving the way for a redefined relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a peace agreement being formed with the former and new border and trade discussions with the latter.

This foreign alignment shake-up has rattled the Kremlin. The Russian government does not want to see Armenia break from its sphere of influence and is thus leaning into its well-practiced hybrid warfare toolkit, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other frontline democracies. Although the official campaign period has not begun, disinformation campaigns, influence operations, and financial cooption are in full swing, presenting an extraordinary stress-test for the fledgling democracy.

To better understand this environment, the McCain Institute organized a pre-election mission to Armenia from February 23-26, 2026. The trip was also supported by the Armenian election observation organization, the Union of Informed Citizens (UIC). The delegation included experts on elections, malign foreign influence, and the region from both Europe and the United States. The purpose of the mission was to understand the pre-election challenges and risks to inform policymakers and publics back home and to develop actionable recommendations for both Armenian and Western policymakers and stakeholders.

The delegation met with political parties, members of parliament, government officials, independent journalists and bloggers, civil society, diplomats and representatives from international organizations, security experts, church leaders, the Central Election Commission (CEC), and election observers.

A key takeaway from the mission is that while Armenia faces similar external and internal threats to other frontline democracies in Europe, the country has unique complexities and vulnerabilities. The country’s foreign policy is not shaped primarily by a “West vs. Russia” alignment but by complicated relations with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey, evolving and being redefined in the post-war era. Armenians see both Azerbaijan and Turkey as far greater threats to the country than Russia, and the plurality (43 percent) of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner. The outcome of the election will determine whether Armenia stays the course on its peace negotiations with Azerbaijan started by the current government, or abandons them, as the main opposition parties indicate.

Further, none of the viable parties is embracing a full break from Russia or necessarily modeling liberal democratic values. Though Pashinyan’s government has opened a promising avenue toward the EU, his party is carefully navigating a balance with both Russia as well neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey. And though democratic progress since 2018 is undeniable, accusations of selective justice and anti-democratic behavior beleaguer the government. Should it again secure a majority, there will also be no pro-democracy opposition in parliament to serve as a check and hold it to account, given the nature of the opposition parties that will likely clear the electoral threshold

Another finding from the mission is that the level of awareness of and preparedness for anti-democratic election threats – both internal and external – is low. For example, Russia freely dominates the country’s information space without consequences, and efforts to preempt false narratives and go on the information offensive are minimal. The Kremlin’s immense financial investments in political, religious, media, and societal actors go mostly unchecked and take advantage of plentiful legal loopholes, like the lack of regulation on charities and political movements. While government agencies have recently established cyber task forces and various training programs to prepare for certain threats, officials acknowledge they are short on expertise and resources, and inter-agency coordination needs further development.

The political landscape is also shaped by a fierce conflict between the government and Church leaders, with the Kremlin playing a heavy hand on the side of the Church. Church leaders — headed by Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians — are actively involved in the country’s politics, supporting opposition parties, particularly the block run by Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan. The State has taken action against clergy, including arresting several bishops on charges ranging from calling a coup against the state to drug charges and corruption, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence.

Finally, an almost unanimous concern shared with the mission is the possibility that the post-election period might be contested if the ruling Civil Contract party of Prime Minister Pashinyan wins. Opposition parties, aided by Russia and its proxies, are sowing the ground to reject the results of the elections, casting doubts on the integrity of the election process.

Armenians repeatedly told the delegation that the U.S.’s elimination of foreign aid has undermined the country’s democracy efforts and ability to defend against Russia. While European donors are supporting numerous activities, it is not enough to fill the gap. Both U.S. and European policymakers should be bolstering funding for civil society and media and providing more technical assistance and training to government agencies in enhancing cyber preparedness, tracking illicit finance, and creating defenses against hybrid threats. Armenia is at a fragile democratic crossroads, and our investments are critical. Further, given the interest of Pashinyan’s government in forging closer ties with both the U.S. and EU, it is an opportunity to ensure Armenia stays on the democratic path by including clear reform benchmarks as conditionalities to other international agreements.

Political Context

The political environment in Armenia is shaped by foreign policy shifts and realignment, a conflict between the government and the Church, and concerns about democratic progress.

Foreign Relations

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been deeply dependent on Russia for security and economic stability. Armenia has been part of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts soured ties between the two states, with Yerevan suspending its participation in the CSTO and asking for the removal of Russian border troops from the airport that had been stationed there since 1992.

While turning away from Russia, the government has pursued EU accession. Pashinyan made EU membership an explicit part of his government’s agenda in 2024, and, in March 2025, Armenia’s National Assembly endorsed this goal. The adoption of a new Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership in December covers commitments on democracy and rule of law and justice reform, human rights, socio-economic development, energy security, digital transformation, trade diversification, and new cooperation on security and defense.

Armenia has also signed a strategic partnership agreement with the U.S., is working on a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and is in new border and trade discussions with Turkey. In January, Armenia and the U.S. announced a framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a transit route in the south Caucasus, building off the peace agreement.

Armenia’s economy, however, is still deeply tied to Russia. Several opposition parties noted that trade with Russia had actually increased under Pashinyan’s rule, which they argue undermines his pro-Western rhetoric. While Armenia’s trade with Russia indeed increased following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Armenia’s trade with Russia dramatically dropped in 2025. Representatives from the government described to the delegation the efforts they were taking to decouple from Russia by taking control of their borders, building small nuclear reactors for more energy independence, and pursuing new trade alliances.

However, most Armenians do not see Russia as a threat. In fact, according to polling by the International Republican Institute, 80 percent of Armenians identify Azerbaijan as the greatest threat, followed by Turkey at 69 percent, with Russia coming in at only 29 percent. Further, 43 percent of Armenians see Russia as the country’s most important partner, higher than any other country. The vast majority of Armenians (65 percent) want to maintain some level of relations with Russia.

The Church

The conflict between the government and Church leaders dominates the political landscape and translates into partisan divisions. One bishop with whom the delegation met described the main factors that led to the conflict. Some are seemingly small, like the government ending separate religious classes in school (integrating religion into Armenian history) and not offering a place for Catholicos to make a New Year’s Eve address, which had been tradition. Most importantly, however, Church leadership blamed Pashinyan for “losing the war” in Nagorno-Karabakh and Catholicos demanded the Prime Minister resign.

The government, for its part, has arrested several clergymen on various charges. Most notably, Archbishop Mikael Adjapahyan was arrested for inciting a coup. The ruling party also accuses Catholicos of aiding Russia’s hybrid warfare. Church leaders have deep ties with Russia, and Catholicos himself has a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, who honored him the Russian State Honor in 2022. Many independent observers have accused him of also having served as a KGB agent.

The reaction to the clergy arrests has been polarizing. Church leaders and the main opposition parties accuse the government of violating free speech and committing judicial malpractice, describing a “culture of fear” for believers. Many civil society, media, and international representatives also believe that the government overstepped in its prosecution of clergy. According to one diplomat with whom the delegation met, the Church investigations were launched based on “the Prime Minister’s wants.” One bishop – who does not support the Catholicos — agreed that the government’s response was “wrong.” In his opinion, Adjapahyan was merely exercising his free speech, and other bishops were arrested on flimsy grounds with “evidence mysteriously lost.” He dismissed, however, the accusation from Church leaders that priests were “not free,” saying that Armenia has never been freer. Another bishop told the delegation, “The biggest lie that’s been told is that there is persecution against the Church.”

Within the Church there are also stark divisions, and many bishops have demanded the resignation of Catholicos and reformation. One bishop told the delegation how, for thousands of years, the Church stayed out of state affairs, but Catholicos “changed everything” by attacking the government with the help of foreign actors. He claimed that Catholicos was motivated by “financial interests.” This claim was backed up by other stakeholders with whom the delegation met, confirming that the Church leaders’ interests were primarily about money. One election observer representative said bluntly, “There is no one questioning the corruption of the Church.” However, given Church rules, only Catholicos can call the Council that could vote on his termination, making him impossible to remove.

Both bishops with whom the delegation met said that the majority of clergy want Catholicos out — according to one bishop, 80 percent — but most are too fearful or dependent on the various perks of the office. A member of the clergy described the Church in a state of “post-Soviet blindness” and a cult-like adherence to the Church leader. Demands for reformation not only involve the resignation of Catholicos but changes in Church practice, including the right for clergy to marry, as well as greater financial transparency mechanisms.

While many Armenians told the delegation that people were not particularly religious, they do have trust in the Church. According to polls, 62 percent of Armenians are very or somewhat satisfied with the Church. However, polling shows that trust in Church leaders is lower (53 percent), and most Armenians would like the Church to stay out of politics and the government to stay out of the Church.

Democracy

Several representatives from civil society, international organizations, election monitoring groups, and media expressed concern to the delegation about what they saw as the government’s anti-democratic behavior, accusing it of creeping authoritarianism. They pointed to what they view as selective justice and “overreach,” particularly as it relates to the arrested Church leaders. Civic leaders expressed worry about the government’s abuse of freedom of speech, pointing to officials forced to resign for simply posting criticism of government action on social media and judges being terminated with questionable cause. One representative from an international observer group said there was clear “abuse of the judicial system.” According to polling, half of Armenians say they are dissatisfied with the courts. Many interlocutors with whom the delegation met accused the international community of ignoring these concerns.

Others defended the government, saying that the charges that have been brought against Church leaders, politicians, and officials are legitimate. One blogger, for example, made the case that there has “never been such freedom as exists today.” Ruling party officials stated that pressure for justice from their constituents was high and that, in some cases, they have adopted an approach that is, in fact, “too soft.” Civil Contract politicians assert that the accused had violated the criminal code, including the archbishop, who was arrested for calling for a coup d’etat. While it was an exercise of speech (to call for a coup), one official acknowledged, in Armenia’s criminal code, it is illegal. In another case, she pointed out, an arrested bishop actually planned kinetic activity.

However, there was widespread concern that if the ruling party is victorious in the election, and there is no pro-Western, pro-democracy opposition in parliament to hold it in check, the risk of authoritarianism will rise. One research institute leader said, “I believe the EU and the US should focus on strengthening democratic norms and institutions, rather than backing political actors which are considered ‘pro-democratic.’ Over the past six months, we have seen alarming signs of democratic backsliding in Armenia, including the ruling party’s instrumentalization of law enforcement and the judiciary for narrow political interests. The EU and U.S.’s silence on these abuses risks emboldening the Pashinyan government after its likely re-election in June, potentially accelerating this negative trend and repeating mistakes they have made in other similar contexts in the past.”

Free, independent media is also at risk. Most interlocutors lamented the pervasive asymmetry in the information space. Anti-democratic actors, oligarchs, and Russia monopolize television, online media, and social media. Oligarchs also fund their own experts, journalists, and opinion makers. In comparison, independent outlets are almost non-existent, having no resources. Journalists also described the highly polarized nature of the media.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare

Almost everyone with whom the delegation met declared Russia’s hybrid warfare in Armenia today as unprecedented. As one NGO leader said, “Russia is all in.” Others compared it to the “Moldova operation.” Diplomats assessed Russia’s operations as “incredibly sophisticated” and described the proliferation of doppelganger sites, mimicking international organizations or news outlets and spreading harmful disinformation. One ruling party MP agreed with the threat assessment, asking the delegation, “How can we be an independent state when there is so much infiltration into our values system?”

Like elsewhere, information is a key weapon in the Kremlin toolkit. Journalists described to the delegation how Russia dominates the airwaves. Unlike bans in countries like Moldova, in Armenia, multiple Russian channels are freely broadcast on television – there are no regulations — and Russia also dominates Telegram and social media. Civic groups explained that the television dominance was particularly problematic as most Armenians rely on TV as their main source of news. One NGO leader said that more than one-third of Armenians were consuming Russian TV every day. There is also limited regulation of the online space. Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) officials explained that the only situation in which they can remove a site is if there are drug transactions. Russian music, films, and news are also ever-present and serve as effective psychological warfare. Films such as Ararat 73, which is about sports, are embedded with Kremlin disinformation.

Civic groups, small opposition parties, and media representatives stated their belief that the government must close down several sites. One politician described how two state TV companies were regularly spreading disinformation and anti-Ukraine, anti-democracy rhetoric, and the state was paying Russian stations to broadcast, adding that it must all stop. There is little appetite, however, among government representatives to take more robust measures against disinformation, such as closing media sites. A representative from the Prime Minister’s office said that they cannot take the “measures of Moldova” and will never close television stations or ban parties.

Russian narratives are similar to those used elsewhere, leaning heavily on culture and tradition themes, including anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and gender issues. Messaging also builds fear about Armenia’s security if it abandons its ties with Russia. Russian narratives give false hope that Russia will “bring back” Nagorno-Karabakh and emphasize that PM Pashinyan is a “puppet of Azerbaijan. Russia also aims to undermine democratic practices and break trust in institutions, particularly in the election process. False narratives about the economy are prevalent. Common messages, according to international organizations that track foreign interference, is that “Armenia will collapse if they leave the Russian market” and “Turkey will swallow Armenia and kill its economy.”

Another effort in Russia’s hybrid war is to co-opt local leaders and influencers. The Kremlin has infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Fight Against Injustice,” established by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russia also actively uses Armenian clergy to spread its narratives. The Catholicos’s brother serves as the Primate of the Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Russia. Independent media representatives told the delegation Catholicos is funded by the Kremlin.

Youth is a key target, and the Kremlin and its proxies in Armenia support camps, debates, and other activities to recruit young people. They also provide financial incentives to recruit youth to mobilize voters. Russia has effectively used young bloggers to spread messages. One civil society representative described the youth target as an attempt to “recapture Armenia.” The delegation heard that, unlike youth in countries like Georgia, in Armenia, young people are more pro-Russian and skeptical of the EU, while actually the older generations were supportive of closer ties with the West.

Armenian stakeholders described how the country was more vulnerable than most to Russian narratives and soft power. According to a 2024 Internews/Prisma study, only 18 percent of respondents are able to recognize and fact-check suspicious information, and only 31 percent could differentiate fact from opinion.

To pay for these operations, Russian money can easily flow into Armenian politics as there is the presence of Russian banks and businesses throughout the country. MIA officials acknowledged to the delegation that foreign transfers were “very significant” and that they did not have satisfactory measures to address them.

Civic groups, international organizations, media representatives, and government officials all complained of the minimal investigation of Russian influence and poorly resourced counter-efforts. One civil society representative explained that while the EU was investing 16 million to resist hybrid warfare, Russia is spending more than 100 million. They also pointed out that the Intelligence Services and Central Bank have made no visible investigations of Kremlin investment in political activities through parties, campaigns, the Church, and charities. There are also legal loopholes – the Corruption Prevention Commission is responsible for monitoring the political finance of parties, but their reports occur only annually, a delay that limits action.

Diplomats confirmed this assessment, explaining that the government had no real strategy or capacity to address Russian hybrid threats and had not invested in preemptive measures or research on tactics. MIA officials argued that the government lacked the legislation, tools, and technology to address hybrid threats, and they needed staff, resources, and international cooperation. The Armenian government has lost support, too, as a senior Corruption Prevention Commission official stated, “Almost all technical assistance has stopped since the closure of USAID,” denying the Commission needed help in monitoring illicit finance and election violations. The government, however, has recently set up a StratCom division and “Public Relations and Information Center.”

The Playing Field

The political field is divided between the ruling Civil Contract Party led by PM Pashinyan and two opposition blocs that are closely tied to Russia and run by oligarchs. Many other political parties plan to compete, but, with Armenia’s electoral threshold, show little sign of entering parliament. According to recent polling from the International Republican Institute (IRI), Civil Contract is running ahead, with 24 percent of Armenians saying they would vote for it. Strong Armenia (Karapetyan) is in second place at nine percent, while no other party polls above three percent.

Many Armenians are undecided and dislike their options, according to interviews with stakeholders. Youth are more apathetic and are less likely to vote and more undecided than other age groups, according to polling. The polling also shows that half of Armenians do not trust any politicians, while that number is 63 percent among youth. One civic group leader described how in voter education workshops, many young people cannot name the prime minister.

Armenians agree that political parties are personality-driven and very scant on policy. In fact, throughout our time in Armenia, people would not even refer to the party’s names (and sometimes didn’t appear to even know the formal names) but would reference the leader. No one could clearly identify the ideologies or concrete platforms of the parties. Some media outlets do plan to support debates in the campaign, which will hopefully provide the public with some clarity. Boon TV will organize thematic debates on geopolitics, and Factor TV shared that they would conduct debates between leaders as well as issue-based dialogues.

One distinction in orientation between the political options is in foreign policy. The ruling party is running on “peace,” following through on peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, including the possibility of a referendum and constitutional change. Civil Contract leaders also discussed their plan for a “measured” decoupling from Russia while forming closer ties with the EU and U.S. Representatives from Civil Contract argued that there was a need to “lock Aliyev in” quickly to the peace deal in order to preempt any backtracking. The ruling party accuses the opposition of “abandoning peace.”

While the opposition blocs do oppose the government’s peace agreement – and could offer no clear alternative to the delegation – they claim to support an alternative plan with conditions. They accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control and believe that Armenia’s “sovereignty is at stake.” The main opposition blocs do not support EU membership and have clear ties with Russia.

Several civic leaders emphasized to the delegation, however, that the “pro-West, pro-Russia” divide among the political options is not so simple (as, say, in Moldova), and some observers expressed distrust of Civil Contract’s commitment to the West, pointing to its continued engagement and economic entanglements with Russia. One civil society leader said, “The government is playing both sides, and it is a geopolitical trap.” Further, as noted, the public does not see Russia as the primary threat to the country; thus, a strong anti-Russian position is not popular.

On other issues, observers described the pre-election rhetoric from all sides as a “race to the bottom,” with disinformation prevalent. A representative from a rights organization said that all political forces were attacking minority groups and running on “traditional values.” Civic groups, journalists, and diplomats described how minorities and marginalized communities bore the brunt of the political attacks on all sides. For example, one observer described how the opposition had accused the government of supporting an LGBTQ parade, and the government responded by doubling down on its own anti-LGBTQ credentials. Women have also been instrumentalized in the pre-election environment, with several smear campaigns against visible female civic leaders. Rights organizations also described the discrimination and lack of protection for disabled communities. For example, representatives argued that there was no guaranteed access to polling stations for those with disabilities due to a lack of accessible infrastructure.

Armenia has no anti-discrimination legislation and, according to rights groups, prevailing public opinion is hostile toward various minority groups, particularly from the LGBTQ community. Rights groups told the delegation that they documented more than 54 hate crime cases this year. Armenia signed but will not ratify the Istanbul Convention, which protects women from domestic violence, and the opposition blocs have claimed it violates Armenia’s traditions.

Rights groups described to the delegation how the United States has become a “model” for attacks on minorities and women. One human rights advocate added that politicians used the United States government as cover – “if the U.S. can attack the LGBTQ community, why not us?” She also described how a U.S. prayer breakfast was hosted in Armenia with evangelicals using a panel for political speeches on abortion and women’s rights.

Civil Contract

The Civil Contract Party is led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and was created in 2015. It is not a part of a coalition and managed to secure a majority of 71 seats in 2021. Independent civic groups, media representatives, and international organizations described the party’s main contrast with the opposition as its more pro-Western orientation and commitment to democracy. One party leader asserted that the party’s top priority was finalizing TRIPP with the U.S, an agreement that, while supported by Civil Contract supporters, does not have the approval of half of the public.

Party leaders pointed out to the delegation that this would be the “first regular election” in Armenia since 2018, as those in 2021 were snap elections. They highlight their party’s successes, including stronger rule of law and the promise of peace. They said they are asking voters to evaluate them based on those two promises. Party officials argue that the elections present a risk of relapse as the viable opposition parties want to introduce Russia or China as a guarantor with Azerbaijan. Party officials also believe that the main opposition parties are running separately but ultimately share the same values and will unite after the elections.

Ruling party officials admit that Armenia has multiple dependencies, including those with Russia, and describe the challenges in their economy. The party stated to the delegation its commitment to reducing those dependencies and forming more economic alliances with the West.

Armenia Alliance (Kocharyan)

The Armenia Alliance is the largest opposition political bloc in Armenia’s National Assembly. It is led by former President Robert Kocharyan whose ties to Russia are strong, and he served on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies, returning to Armenia in 2021 to compete in snap elections against Pashinyan. Party representatives complained to the delegation about the “anti-democratic acts” of the government, which they accuse of attacking parties, journalists, and NGOs and waging “war against the Church.”

Party officials also described the unequal conditions in the pre-election environment. The parliament passed election legislation to redistrict certain constituencies in the local elections and to put restrictions on election observation. They said these were in violation of the Venice Commission, which forbids electoral changes within a year of an election. They also described the crackdown on media critical of the government. They expressed concern of a “Moldova scenario,” where the government might ban certain political parties for their ties to Russia. One party official claimed that the secret service installed software on his phone and searched his son’s apartment. They also expressed fear that the government would declare a state of emergency and cancel elections.

Party officials described their platform as revolving around four key issues. The first focus is on security, and the party described Armenia as “occupied” by Azerbaijan. Second, the party is running on what it calls “national identity,” and promises an emphasis on Church, language, and history. Third, the party is running on “justice,” accusing the government, police, and prosecutors office of corruption and bias. Finally, the party endorses a “balanced foreign policy,” which officials described as not allowing the conflict between Russia and the West from “affecting Armenia.”

In response to delegation questions about the party’s support for the EU, officials had no clear answer and deflected by saying that the government had not complied with the needed action plan and that the country “was not ready.” Officials would also not comment on Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. When asked what the party would do with the peace agreement with Azerbaijan if it won the elections, officials were unclear. They pointed out only that key clauses were left out of the agreement, including the rights for POWs in Baku and issues related to changes in the text of the Constitution.

The party described the threats of Russian hybrid warfare in Armenia as “government propaganda.” Officials said the threats were not from Russia but from Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Our Way/Strong Armenia (Karapetyan)

Last year, businessman Samvel Karapetyan founded this political movement, which officially registered as a political party in January 2026. Karapetyan is the owner of the Russia-based Tashir Group conglomerate. In June 2025, he was arrested on charges of inciting “public calls to seize power” after publicly defending the Church in its ongoing dispute with Prime Minister Pashinyan. Karapetyan was released on bail and is under house arrest. Due to his Russian and Cypriot citizenship, he cannot serve as the party’s prime minister candidate so his nephew, Narek Karapetyan, will run.

Similar to Armenia Alliance, Strong Armenia has numerous complaints about the government and is campaigning in large part on these criticisms. Officials described the government’s attacks on the Church, political prosecutions, and unlawful seizure of property. In particular, the party officials focused on the charges against Karapetyan, which they defined as “trumped up charges” and described him as a “political prisoner.” They said he had been mistreated and lost his property rights. They also claim that nine of their planned candidates had been arrested. Party representatives described to the delegation a “culture of fear” in which people were afraid to attend their events or even speak freely.

Strong Armenia party officials told the delegation that Karapetyan’s electric company had been seized by the government in a move to nationalize the electricity network due to an “energy crisis,” which they say is bogus. The government has installed a temporary governor of the board. Party officials did acknowledge that the owners were compensated, though they claimed it was not at full price. The case is in the Constitutional Court. The party believes this is all because Karapetyan is a political threat and supports the Church.

Party representatives describe the party’s foreign policy objectives as “balanced.” When asked about the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the party says that it would “continue” the peace process but under different terms. The main demands would be sovereignty, removal of armed forces, release of POWs in Azerbaijan, and preconditions for Azerbaijan. The party officials said Karapetyan is the “Armenian Trump” and will “make a good deal.”

Strong Armenia officials said that Pashinyan falsely accuses them of benefiting from and aiding Russian hybrid warfare, though they point out that the government had doubled trade with Russia. They were critical of TRIPP, arguing that it puts Armenia in an “unequal situation.”

Smaller Parties

While the Armenian pre-election environment is dominated by the conflict between the ruling party and the major opposition parties, which the former considers anti-democratic and pro-Russian, there are several smaller democratic and pro-Western opposition parties competing in the elections. As one smaller party leader told the delegation, “The opposition is not a monolith.”

The New Power Party, formed in 2024 and led by the former Mayor of Yerevan Hayk Marutyan, defines itself as a leftist, social-democratic party. Party leaders told the delegation that they would not form alliances before the elections because they see no one as “clean or suitable.” The NPP defines itself as the “carriers of the 2018 revolution” and argue that the government betrayed those values. Party officials accuse the government of nepotism and corruption – buying big cars and luxury items – and of interference in local government. The New Power Party leaders say that their main challenges are securing resources and the small space for third parties given the high electoral threshold.

The Republic Party is a small but older party established in 2001 and led by the former Prime Minister of Armenia, Aram Sargsyan, who served from 1999 to 2000. Party leaders explained to the delegation that the focus of the party was Western orientation and economic growth. The party supports “drastic changes” in foreign policy and does not support a “balanced” approach like the others. For example, they want to immediately leave the Eurasian Economic Union and cut ties with Russia. The party also boasted to the delegation of being the ones who initiated the petition for EU membership and prepared the legal document submitted to the government. They defined the main opposition parties as: “Russian oligarch, Russian oligarch plus the Church, and Armenian oligarch.” Party officials told the delegation they would like to see Armenia adopt the “Moldova approach” and ban these parties.

Party leaders believe they can clear the threshold, and have ruled out forming a bloc with other parties. They did, however, tell the delegation that they would consider joining the government if certain conditions were met, including the creation of a vice prime minister who would oversee compliance with EU and U.S. agreements and establishment of new ministries on nuclear energy, culture and diaspora, and agriculture and resource management. The party advocates that pre-election alliances be banned by law because Armenia has so many small parties that just want money in exchange for joining blocs to compete in elections.

The Rally for the Republic Party was formed in 2020 and is also running on a pro-EU accession platform and participated in the EU signature campaign. They wanted to run together with the Republic Party, but the latter preferred to compete separately. Their platform includes leaving all Russian-affiliated entities, including the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO. Party leaders said they want to be a pro-democracy, pro-EU opposition in parliament to serve as a check on the government.

Electoral Administration

System

Armenia’s elections are governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and the country’s Electoral Code. The National Assembly has a minimum of 101 members who are elected every five years. The election of deputies must not be held later than 50 days prior to the expiry of the existing National Assembly’s term. The President of the Republic of Armenia calls the elections in both regular and extraordinary cases.

The National Assembly is elected through a proportional representation system with a closed national list in which voters elect a party rather than a specific candidate.

The Electoral Code requires the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, defined as 52 percent of seats. If such a majority is not formed through elections or the formation of a political coalition, a second round of elections may be held. A party must receive at least four percent of the total votes cast to gain any seats in parliament, and the threshold is eight percent for blocs of up to three parties and ten percent for blocs consisting of four or more parties.

Armenian citizens on diplomatic service, in the military seconded to a foreign state, or studying abroad, have the right to vote in National Assembly elections. The only means of voting from abroad is electronically via an online computer program. The Electoral Code does not include provisions for the specified individuals to vote in-person at consulates or embassies. Other Armenians abroad are not eligible to vote from abroad and must return to Armenia if they wish to vote in an election.

Administration

Elections of the National Assembly are organized by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), an independent state body. The chairperson and six other members of the CEC are elected by the National Assembly upon at least three-fifths of the total number of deputies, for a six-year term. Elected CEC members may not serve for more than two consecutive terms. Elections are also administered by district electoral commissions and precinct electoral commissions. The CEC appoints the district members for six-year terms. Precinct electoral commissions are temporary bodies formed to organize polling and counting for each election. They have at least seven members nominated by parliamentary groups and the respective district electoral commission. The CEC told the delegation that, in the June elections, there will be 38 voting precincts and approximately 2,000 polling stations.

Election officials expressed to the delegation confidence in their preparedness for the June elections. They described technical assistance from the UK to address cyber security and risk management training from other international groups, like the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). The CEC leaders said that each district commission had been conducting tests to prepare.

MIA leaders described their two main functions in the elections: the voter list and security. They have developed rapid response mechanisms to address vote buying and intimidation and to maintain public order. They have also conducted programs to raise awareness about guidelines. On election day, MIA officials explained to the delegation that there were clear rules about their presence in the polling stations and when they can intervene. They also conduct inspections of the polling stations before election day and monitor the transfer of electoral documents after voting. The Ministry has established 24/7 hotlines for citizens to file complaints.

The voters list is based on the population registry, and the MIA makes regular corrections. The list, MIA officials say, is accurate, and there have been no serious problems. On election day, there are ways in which citizens can get provisional identification to vote if there is something wrong with their documents.

Non-partisan observers and international organizations told the delegation that the country had a “technically sound” election process and highlighted the fact that the opposition did not contest recent local elections.

Election Observation

Armenia’s Electoral Code allows local and international organizations to observe elections. Observers have the right to be present during voting and ballot processing and to publicly make statements about the organization and execution of an election. They cannot intervene in the activities of the electoral commission or poll workers or make claims to members of a commission. In January 2026, Armenia adopted a law, initiated by the Civil Contract party, allowing the CEC to revoke the accreditation of election monitoring missions that are not “politically neutral,” and the Commission will make this assessment of each member.

Election observer groups told the delegation that they have already started their work for these elections. Transparency International, for example, has set up a political finance monitor and social media monitor. They also are deploying long-term observers as well as short-term observers, who will monitor 15 percent of precincts using sample-based observation. TI is also conducting voter education. The Union of Informed Citizens (UIC) together with Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly – Vanadzor are organizing long term observers and short term observers who will do mobile groups. They have also created a fact-checking partnership to correct false reports on election violations. They plan to conduct a unique voter awareness program to coach voters on “how to lie” to those who are trying to pressure them to vote for a certain person and to remind voters of the secrecy of the vote. Groups will distribute fact sheets to Armenians traveling from Russia and Georgia to vote.

Political Finance

Party finances are primarily regulated by the Law on Political Parties, while campaign finances are regulated by the Electoral Code. Parties must submit annual declarations of their funding sources, assets, and expenditures annually. Every party that received at least two percent of the vote in the previous National Assembly election receives funds from the State Budget. Individuals can donate no more than 10 million Armenian dram to a party per year. Donations from any legal entities, including charitable and religious organizations, state and community non-commercial organizations, foreign states and nationals, international organizations, stateless people, and anonymous people are prohibited.

The Corruption Prevention Commission is an autonomous institution with the mandate to investigate public officials and oversee political finance. The Commission is responsible for the public declarations of officials, their annual assets, income, and interests. The Commission analyzes party reports and identifies violations.

The Anti-Corruption Committee described its election-related jurisdiction over charities, vote buying, and election crimes. Officials described their operational intelligence department, allowing them to “reveal, prevent, and investigate.” They also said they cooperate closely with the police and National Security Services. However, they do not have jurisdiction over violent crimes. Committee officials described their work enhancing public awareness through animated videos and education programs with students. As a committee leader told the delegation, “The most effective way to fight corruption is to have a society with values.”

Challenges

CEC officials, like others with whom the delegation met, described the problem of third-party expenditures on behalf of political campaigns, which are not captured by the regulations. Political initiatives, movements, or charities have no regulations or limitations on spending and funding. A Corruption Prevention Commission official said that foreign entities could quite easily give money to a charity or NGO, which then disperses the money through individuals to donate to political parties or pay directly for political campaign events and activities. Election monitoring organization representatives said that they had submitted a proposal to parliament to include third parties in the campaign finance regulations and expose them to criminal or administrative liability.

While Armenia has several bodies responsible for monitoring and enforcing political and campaign finance, as described above, most interlocutors complained of rampant illicit political funding and loopholes in the legislation. For example, the Corruption Prevention Commission, charged with reviewing party’s finances, collects reports annually, so the public will only learn of violations a year after the elections have taken place. The Commission is aware that the annual monitoring precludes real-time findings and results. (The CEC Oversight and Audit Service does receive and publish regular information about campaign spending during the campaign period.) Commission officials said that donors also spread out their contributions through individuals – often unknowingly – to avoid oversight. MIA leaders confirmed this concern and described the limitations to tracking illegal funding. Officials also complained that multiple transactions went undetected because they were in cash.

The Corruption Prevention Commission leaders said that lessons learned from previous elections include the need to do more awareness campaigns with banks, parties, and the public, and have better coordination with the CEC. The Commission outlined other challenges as their limited resources, vacant staff positions, and low salaries. Further, the end of USAID meant that technical assistance had virtually stopped, according to officials. Anti-Corruption Committee officials identified similar concerns as the Commission, including the loophole on third parties and charities participating in politics. They also said that there is little investment or mandate for the government to work on the information space and counter foreign interference. Committee officials defined their needs: more qualified staff, better training for officers, enhanced cybersecurity measures, equipment, training in hybrid attacks, and more opportunities to exchange with other countries.

The shortcomings of the Central Election Commission were raised repeatedly with the delegation, particularly its alleged lack of independence. Civil society, media, international organizations, and party representatives all pointed to the fact that the Commissioner was recently an MP from the ruling Civil Contract party. Some described how this bias translated into unfair treatment of the opposition parties, casting doubt on the election process. Others said that the Commissioner failed to act against opposition violations for fear of being viewed as partisan, what one election observer called “over-correcting.” Even an official from Civil Contract acknowledged that this appointment was problematic but that the chair had ruled well and “so far so good.” A few election monitoring organization representatives asserted that the problem wasn’t the bias but the lack of competence, pointing to the failure of the CEC leadership to implement the tasks for which they are responsible. One monitor pointed out that the CEC had “failed completely” to conduct oversight.

Non-partisan observers and international organizations pointed to the election vulnerabilities to Russian interference. The CEC, they said, had no strategy to combat Russian disinformation about the elections and the results, nor was it prepared for possible cyberattacks. A key vulnerability, according to Armenian observer groups, was the possibility of Russia interfering with the cameras in the polling stations.

Another complaint from opposition officials and some civil society representatives was the change in election law on election observation missions, described above. They point out that these changes took place within one year of the election, counter to the Venice Commission rules. CEC officials and some observer groups argued, however, that the law had to be changed due to a serious problem of the politicization of observation missions, breaking the rule of neutrality, particularly the observer group Hayakve that was overtly political in the local elections in 2025. One Armenian observer group representative also pointed out that these challenges were brand new and thus could not have been addressed earlier. The CEC also argued that the change in legislation was merely “technical in nature” and thus permitted.

When asked by the delegation who determines whether an observer is politically neutral and how that determination was made, CEC officials were quite vague, simply saying that they would make the decision “based on evidence.” One international observer said that the determination by the CEC was “completely subjective.”

Another key issue raised during the mission was the return of Armenian diaspora to vote. Civic groups and observers described in great detail how Russia was actively involved in financing and organizing groups of Armenians in Russia to come home to vote. While the CEC estimated that there are approximately 60,000 Armenians eligible to vote residing in Russia, there are no official statistics.  CEC representatives pointed out, however, that Armenian citizens had the right to vote regardless of residency if they returned to Armenia for polling day and emphasized the secret ballot allows these voters to vote according to their conscience despite prior pressures.  MIA officials explained that it was, however, a crime for Russia or other actors to transport voters to the polls but the government would need to establish “criminal intent.” While a representative from the Prime Minister’s office expressed a personal desire for future restrictions on dual Armenian citizens who live outside the country returning home to vote, this is not the official government position.

The government’s abuse of administrative resources was cited as a problem during most of the delegation’s meetings. The government in the past, observer groups alleged, had used development projects and civil servants to influence the vote. Representatives from Civil Contract countered that the government was taking this issue seriously, with one MP pointing out that a school administrator associated with the party had been charged and that all cases were open to the public. A representative from the Prime Minister’s office said that the abuse of administrative resources did not happen and there was no pressure on civil servants.

Civic groups and observers described the need for electoral reforms. One reform would be to change the high threshold that prevents smaller, pro-democracy parties from entering parliament and gives an “unfair advantage” to the ruling party. Further, the appointment of the chairperson of the CEC should be changed to provide checks on ruling party dominance. One international elections expert said that they recommend a rolling commission and involving others outside parliament in the selection process.

Many Armenian and foreign representatives and election observers expressed concern about post election developments. This is when accusations and Russian manipulation would be, according to these observers, at “its peak.” Armenian observer groups said that the fake reports on violations would start on election day to sow doubt in the outcome. A representative from the Prime Minister’s office said that the opposition would use “every tool” to protest the election results but added that she was not concerned about violence.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Armenia’s election represents a consequential opportunity for the country to carry on a new course for peace, foreign policy alignment, security, and economic opportunities, which have profound ripple effects on regional stability and growth. The U.S. and EU benefit from this new course and should be providing the support both before and after the elections to see it through.

However, forces inside and outside the country are investing in thwarting those opportunities. The country is not adequately prepared to take on these threats, particularly unprecedented Russian hybrid attacks on the election process. The elimination of USAID has made matters far worse by kneecapping critical civic and media efforts, government monitoring and preparedness, and strategic communication support, undermining the country’s ability to defend against Russia.

While international partners should not only increase their support and technical assistance, they are also uniquely positioned to explicitly include democratic development during their negotiations, such as TRIPP. If the government wins again, there will likely be no pro-Western opposition in parliament to hold them to account and serve as a check. U.S./ EU and Armenia strategic dialogues should emphasize an inclusive democracy strategy that engages civil society and other actors beyond the ruling party’s circle.

The Armenian government, parliament, and election-related agencies could consider the following recommendations:

Elections

• To facilitate information-sharing and enable rapid, coordinated responses to emerging electoral risks and threats, the government could establish an elections interagency task force composed of representatives from all key government agencies and stakeholders involved in the electoral process, together with civil society representatives and international observer groups.
• Enhanced coordination between the CEC and the MIA is necessary in investigating allegations of transportation of and payments to Armenian diaspora to vote. This cooperation should aim to safeguard Armenian citizens’ fundamental constitutional right to vote, while simultaneously preventing potential abuses such as vote buying or organized manipulation.
• Ahead of the elections, the CEC should strengthen its oversight and clarify the responsibilities between the CEC and other various agencies responsible for election-related oversight. A mechanism should be urgently explored to allow the CEC and other oversight bodies to fill critical vacancies with either temporary, qualified personnel, special pay rates, or contractors.
• Following the elections, parliament should consider electoral amendments to enhance CEC transparency and legitimacy, with close involvement of and input from civil society and international partners, including
  • Changing the selection process for the Chair of the CEC to ensure non-partisanship and more diversity in the selection process. (This would require a constitutional change.)
  • Addressing loopholes in the legislation that allows third party (charities, NGOs, movements) expenditures for political purposes.
  • Tightening criminal measures against political parties, movements, or affiliated groups from receiving foreign financing year-round.
  • Changing the political and campaign finance reporting requirements to a more frequent schedule to allow real-time monitoring.
  • Allocating greater resources and staff for the Anti-Corruption Committee, the Corruption Prevention Commission, and the CEC.
  • Consider reducing the electoral threshold to allow more political diversity in parliament.

Submitting draft legislation to the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR for assessment could help ensure alignment with international standards and reduce the risk of legal provisions being misused for political purposes.

Hybrid Threats

• To effectively address foreign threats, a comprehensive whole-of-society approach should be developed. This platform could be incorporated into the National Security Council, or another existing body, and would bring government agencies (including financial agencies, tax authorities, and intelligence) together with civil society, education experts and academia, and researchers to strengthen resilience against hybrid interference. Efforts should include: investments in public communications (media, online, educational) to provide accurate information and democratic national narratives to preempt disinformation campaigns; increased staffing and training in cybersecurity; and monitoring units to track influence operations, including disinformation campaigns, illicit finance, and foreign support to political candidates or operatives.
• Parliament, in close consultation with civil society and media experts, should consider legislation to tackle inauthentic and harmful television and online content, particularly from foreign sources, that pose a threat to Armenian democracy, institutions, and security. Parliament should consider broadcasting rules that stop or limit Russian content on national television networks and invest in public broadcasting that focuses on civic and democracy education.

Rule of Law

• To avoid the perception of politically motivated prosecution and selective application of justice, law-enforcement agencies should publicly present evidence in each case. The ruling party and government officials should refrain from commenting on ongoing investigations and judicial proceedings for the respect of the presumption of innocence. Proposed judicial reforms from civil society should be considered in collaboration with parliament and relevant experts to strengthen judicial independence and increase public trust.

Campaign

• Political parties and contestants must forcefully communicate to supporters to reject any acts of violence during or after the election process and to remain calm as the CEC works to certify the official results. All electoral complaints should be filed through proper legal channels and judicial decisions should be followed.
• Political parties and contestants should stop negatively using marginalized and vulnerable communities (women, minorities, LGBTQ community) in their campaign messaging and attacks.
• Religious leaders should not participate in the campaign in any way (interviews, sermons, financing, voter outreach, campaign events); government and party representatives should not intervene in Church matters (conduct campaign events at religious sites or utilize Church figures in their campaigns).

European, U.S., and other international allies should consider the following:

• Increasing technical assistance, financing, and training to (and enhancing intelligence cooperation with) Armenian authorities to defend against foreign hybrid efforts. Investment is needed in cybersecurity, electoral violence prevention, anti-corruption measures, banking controls, communications, and intelligence. Support exchanges for Armenian election, anti-corruption, and security officials with counterparts in other countries.
• Enacting personal and financial sanctions for known pro-Russian operatives in Armenia, particularly those responsible for illegal financing schemes or sabotage efforts.
• (For U.S.) Reinstating critical funding for independent media organizations and local civil society groups that provide essential reporting on politics, the economy, and foreign policy, conduct resilience-building initiatives — including civic education and media literacy — and monitor and report on Russian hybrid warfare.
• (For U.S.) Reinstating critical public diplomacy programs, including funding for the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and support for international organizations and others working to enhance local journalism and education, as well as international election organizations. Reinstate funding for domestic election monitors that are key to evaluating the conduct of the elections, exposing irregularities, and building public trust in the process.

Following the elections, the U.S. and European partners need to prepare for different scenarios and instability and should be in lockstep on how to evaluate the elections and on future engagement with the next government. The international community will need to closely monitor the post-election environment, particularly given the prospect of opposition parties rejecting the results in the case of a Civil Contract victory, and facilitate a peaceful sitting of a new parliament.

• The international community must stand behind the findings from trusted domestic and international observers about the integrity of the elections.
• The EU and U.S. should invest significantly in post-election observer efforts, including high-level international delegations to monitor developments and demonstrate support.

This report is offered in the spirit of democratic partnership with the aim of encouraging free and fair elections in June and a peaceful transition to the next parliament. This report is based on the conversations with interlocutors during the mission and does not represent the full range of opinions and analysis on the election environment.