Findings from a McCain Institute Follow-Up Assessment Visit
September 5–11, 2026
Introduction
From September 5–11, the McCain Institute conducted a follow-up assessment visit to Armenia, building on its February 23–26 pre-election mission. During the September visit, the McCain Institute conducted more than 20 meetings and interviews with representatives of civil society, academia, independent media, think tanks, the security community, religious institutions, and other stakeholders.
The purpose of the visit was to better understand Armenia’s political, democratic, and security environment following the June 7 parliamentary elections and to identify emerging opportunities and risks relevant to policymakers and publics in the United States.
The visit found Armenia at an important moment of opportunity. The country continues to distinguish itself in a difficult neighborhood through competitive politics, an active civil society, and a government pursuing closer relations with the United States and European Union. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has also advanced an ambitious peace agenda and sought to diversify Armenia’s foreign relationships while navigating significant economic and security dependencies.
At the same time, many interlocutors emphasized that Armenia’s democratic and geopolitical transitions remain unfinished. They raised concerns about institutional checks and balances, judicial independence, political polarization, public distrust, and the absence of a strong democratic political alternative. They also stressed that Armenia’s ability to reduce its dependence on Russia will depend on whether Western engagement produces practical economic, security, and regional alternatives.
The overarching message from the visit was therefore one of opportunity coupled with the need for long-term investment. Western partners have an opening to deepen relations with Armenia, but sustainable progress will require investment not only in government-to-government cooperation but also in the independent institutions, civil society, media, youth, and rule-of-law architecture necessary for democratic resilience.
Armenia Is Diversifying, Not Simply Choosing Between Russia and the West
As the McCain Institute’s February assessment found, Armenia’s foreign policy cannot be understood simply through a “West versus Russia” framework. The September visit reinforced this conclusion.
There is widespread disappointment with Russia, particularly following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow’s failure to provide the security many Armenians expected. Nevertheless, interlocutors across the political spectrum emphasized that Armenia remains deeply connected to Russia economically, socially, and through elements of its security architecture.
None of the viable political forces appears to favor an immediate rupture with Moscow. Even strongly pro-European interlocutors cautioned that European integration will be a long process and that Armenia cannot safely dismantle existing relationships before credible alternatives are available.
The government’s effort to strengthen relations with Europe and the United States while maintaining functional relations with Russia therefore reflects both political preference and geopolitical necessity.
Several interlocutors nevertheless warned that Russia retains substantial soft power and significant opportunities to influence Armenia’s political and information environment. Russia’s continued ability to exploit economic dependencies, social relationships, political polarization, and public insecurity remains an important vulnerability.
Western policy should consequently focus less on asking Armenia to choose between geopolitical camps and more on expanding the choices available to Armenia.
Armenia-Türkiye Normalization Could Fundamentally Change the Equation
One of the strongest points of agreement during the visit was the importance of normalization between Armenia and Türkiye.
Interlocutors from different political perspectives argued that opening the Armenia-Türkiye border could be transformative. Increased trade, transportation, investment, and regional connectivity could reduce Armenia’s geographic isolation and provide economic alternatives to its dependence on Russia.
Many interlocutors encouraged the United States and European governments to use their relationships with Ankara to advance normalization. They also argued that progress between Armenia and Türkiye should be encouraged wherever possible, including steps that need not wait for resolution of every outstanding issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
TRIPP was similarly identified by several security and foreign-policy experts as an important opportunity for sustained U.S. engagement. If implemented transparently and with respect for Armenia’s sovereignty, greater regional connectivity could help embed Armenia in more diversified economic relationships and give the country greater strategic room to maneuver.
For Western policymakers, Armenia-Türkiye normalization should therefore be understood not simply as a bilateral diplomatic issue but as an important component of Armenia’s long-term economic and strategic resilience.
Democratic Gains Need Stronger Institutional Foundations
Armenia’s democratic progress since 2018 remains significant. The June elections were competitive, and international observers concluded that they were professionally administered and offered voters genuine political alternatives. (ODIHR)
However, many interlocutors emphasized that democratic progress needs to be reinforced through stronger institutions.
Concerns about the independence and public credibility of the judiciary arose repeatedly. Civil society representatives also raised questions about checks and balances, transparency, police accountability, and perceptions of selective justice.
Tensions between the government and Armenian Apostolic Church have further complicated these concerns. Some interlocutors reported that government actions involving clergy have generated sympathy for the Church among Armenians who may not otherwise identify strongly with it. This was particularly notable in discussions about younger Armenians.
For these citizens, the issue is not necessarily theological or even political support for Church leadership. Rather, some view the confrontation through the lens of unequal institutional power and worry about the broader implications for dissent and due process.
These perceptions should be taken seriously regardless of views about the merits of individual cases. Public confidence that courts operate independently and consistently is essential both for democratic legitimacy and for the government’s own reform agenda.
Strengthening rule of law should therefore be understood as supporting Armenia’s democratic trajectory rather than as criticism of any particular political actor.
A Generational Challenge Is Emerging
Youth emerged as one of the most important themes of the September visit.
Younger Armenians have experienced a very different political trajectory from the generation that participated in the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Some were children during the revolution and do not have a strong personal connection to it. Their political experience has instead been shaped by war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the deaths of friends and relatives, regional insecurity, and an increasingly polarized domestic environment.
Interlocutors described significant political frustration and disengagement among younger Armenians. Some supporters of the government also expressed concern that disaffected young people could become more receptive to political, religious, or information networks supported by Russia.
At the same time, this generation represents one of Armenia’s greatest democratic opportunities.
Western donors should significantly expand youth engagement but reconsider how they conduct it. Traditional workshops, conferences, and civic education programs often reach citizens who are already engaged. Programs should experiment with new formats—including festivals, cultural initiatives, entrepreneurship, technology, university networks,
community projects, exchanges, and local leadership opportunities—to engage young Armenians outside established political and NGO circles.
The objective should not be to steer young Armenians toward a particular party or geopolitical position. It should be to increase their participation, political agency, and ability to organize around issues that matter to their communities.
Political Pluralism Remains Underdeveloped
The February mission found that Armenia’s political parties were highly personality-driven and that the country lacked a strong democratic and pro-Western opposition capable of providing an effective parliamentary check on the government. The September visit found that this challenge remains.
Many interlocutors continue to see Prime Minister Pashinyan as the dominant owner of both the peace and democratic reform agendas. At the same time, Armenia lacks strong alternative political movements organized around coherent policies rather than individual leaders.
This is not principally a question of supporting or opposing the government. Healthy democratic systems require competition, checks and balances, leadership renewal, and credible alternatives.
Western assistance should therefore support the infrastructure from which democratic pluralism can emerge: local civic organizations, policy institutes, independent media, universities, watchdogs, professional associations, youth networks, and opportunities for new leaders to develop skills and public profiles.
Such programming should remain nonpartisan and should not seek to create preferred political actors. Its purpose should be to widen the space for democratic participation.
Western Assistance Should Reach Beyond Established Networks
A notable criticism raised during the visit concerned the way international donors engage Armenian civil society.
Several interlocutors argued that visiting Western delegations and donors often meet primarily with organizations they already support. This can unintentionally create an echo chamber and limit exposure to perspectives outside established professional networks.
Some interlocutors also expressed concern that parts of Armenia’s NGO sector have become increasingly focused on donor requirements and reporting rather than community-level impact. Short funding cycles can reinforce this problem by rewarding easily measurable activities rather than long-term institutional development.
These criticisms should not obscure the essential role Armenian civil society has played in the country’s democratic development. Rather, they suggest an opportunity to broaden and strengthen that investment.
Donors should continue supporting experienced organizations while deliberately seeking out emerging groups, regional organizations, informal civic initiatives, universities, professional communities, and actors outside Yerevan. More multi-year and core institutional support would also allow organizations to prioritize long-term impact rather than short-term deliverables.
Rule of Law Should Be a Central Pillar of Western Engagement
Rule of law emerged repeatedly as an area where interlocutors would like to see greater international attention.
Independent and trusted courts are important not only for democracy and human rights but also for economic development, investment, security, and public confidence. Greater judicial independence would strengthen Armenia regardless of which political party holds office.
U.S. and European engagement should therefore increase support for judicial transparency, professional legal institutions, independent court monitoring, police accountability, parliamentary oversight, investigative journalism, and civil society watchdogs.
The objective should be institutional rather than political: ensuring that Armenia develops systems capable of applying the law consistently and transparently to government officials, opposition figures, business interests, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens alike.
This approach would also reinforce the government’s stated European ambitions. Deeper integration with European institutions will ultimately depend not only on foreign-policy orientation but on continued progress in rule of law, institutional accountability, and democratic governance.
Rethinking the Response to Disinformation
Foreign malign influence remains a serious challenge. The McCain Institute’s February assessment documented concerns about Russian influence operations and Armenia’s limited capacity to respond. (McCain Institute)
The September visit, however, suggested that Western programming should broaden its understanding of information resilience.
Several interlocutors described an Armenian public saturated with political information but increasingly skeptical of virtually all of it. Citizens may consume large amounts of news and political content while having little confidence in media, government, political parties, or other information sources.
This cynicism can make some forms of disinformation less effective, but it creates another vulnerability: citizens who believe that everyone manipulates information may eventually disengage from public life altogether.
Western programs should therefore complement counter-disinformation initiatives with investments in institutions that create trustworthy information: independent journalism, investigative reporting, transparent government data, watchdog organizations, media sustainability, and local civic institutions.
The goal should be not simply to counter false narratives but to strengthen the public’s ability to identify and trust credible information.
Recommendations
For the United States and European partners:
- Broaden democratic assistance beyond government institutions. Continue close cooperation with Armenia’s elected government while ensuring substantial support reaches independent media, civil society, watchdog organizations, universities, professional associations, local communities, and emerging civic leaders.
- Elevate rule of law and judicial independence. Expand technical assistance and long-term programming focused on judicial transparency, court monitoring, police accountability, parliamentary oversight, anti-corruption institutions, and consistent application of the law.
- Make Armenia-Türkiye normalization a diplomatic priority. Use Western relationships with Ankara and Yerevan to encourage border opening, transportation links, trade, and other confidence-building measures that can reduce Armenia’s economic isolation.
- Translate Western engagement into practical alternatives. Support regional connectivity, trade diversification, energy resilience, investment, cybersecurity, and appropriate security cooperation so that Armenia has viable alternatives to excessive dependence on any single external partner.
- Expand youth engagement. Develop programming outside traditional democracy-assistance formats, including cultural events, exchanges, entrepreneurship, technology, universities, community initiatives, and leadership networks.
- Diversify civil society partnerships. Continue supporting proven organizations while expanding outreach beyond established grantees and Yerevan-based networks. Donors and visiting delegations should routinely engage organizations and communities outside their traditional partners.
- Prioritize long-term impact. Increase multi-year and institutional funding and evaluate programs based on demonstrable local impact rather than primarily on activities, events, or reporting outputs.
- Invest in democratic watchdogs. Expand support for independent organizations monitoring courts, parliament, police, procurement, political finance, conflicts of interest, and implementation of government policies.
- Broaden information-resilience programming. Continue addressing foreign malign influence while investing more heavily in independent journalism, transparency, media sustainability, and institutions that can rebuild public trust.
- Support democratic pluralism without choosing political favorites. Invest in the civic, policy, and leadership infrastructure that enables new democratic voices and alternatives to emerge organically.
Conclusion
The September visit reinforced the central finding of the McCain Institute’s February assessment: Armenia’s future cannot be reduced to a binary choice between Russia and the West.
Armenia has an important opportunity to diversify its foreign relationships, strengthen ties with the United States and Europe, advance normalization with its neighbors, and consolidate the democratic progress made since 2018. The Pashinyan government has opened significant space for these developments through its peace agenda and pursuit of closer Western relationships.
Western partners can help make that progress more durable by ensuring their engagement extends beyond any single government or political moment.
Armenia’s long-term resilience will ultimately depend on strong and independent institutions, credible checks and balances, a vibrant and diverse civil society, independent media, political pluralism, meaningful opportunities for young people, and economic and security relationships that provide the country with genuine strategic choices.
This is also where Armenia possesses an important advantage. Interlocutors across very different political perspectives expressed pride in Armenia’s democratic identity and its distinction from many countries in the region. Western partners should build on that sense of ownership. Democratic reform is most sustainable when Armenians see it not as an external condition but as an Armenian achievement worth protecting.
The United States and Europe therefore have an opportunity to pursue two mutually reinforcing objectives: deepen Armenia’s integration with democratic partners while helping strengthen the institutions that will sustain its democracy regardless of who governs.
As Armenia enters its next political chapter, the goal should not be to choose its future for it, but to ensure that Armenians have the institutions, connections, and choices necessary to determine that future themselves.